Re: One commentary whether or not the PTAB may employ the “BRI"standard in IPRs
posted on
Jun 02, 2016 03:57PM
CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, :
Petitioner, : No. 15-446 5 v. :
MICHELLE K. LEE, UNDER SECRETARY :
OF COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL :
PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR, PATENT AND :
TRADEMARK OFFICE,
MR. BEENEY: comment
"Consistent with history, Congress left to
the judiciary to determine construction standards, and
therefore, in the American Invents Act, there is no
explicit statutory language directing the Patent and
Trademark Office to use any particular standard of claim
construction."
Re: minutes of hearing BRI vs. Ordinary meaning
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, if -- if the -- if
the patent is invalid under its broadest, reasonable
interpretation, doesn't -- doesn't that mean the PTO
should never have issued the patent in the first place,
and doesn't that give very significant meaning and
structure to this process?
MR. BEENEY: Not necessarily, Justice
Kennedy. And -- and the reason is this: The purpose of
the broadest reasonable interpretation expedient, as the
government agrees it is, it is not a claim-construction
standard as the Federal circuit said in Skvorecz.
What it does is try to test for ambiguity in
the claim language, not patentability. Patentability is
the standard that Congress set in inter partes review.
But what the broadest reasonable interpretation does is
try to test for ambiguity in the patent language so it
can be amended. So the fact that a patented invention
or an application may not pass the broadest reasonable
expedient does not mean that the inventor has not
claimed a patentable invention. It simply means that
the language is ambiguous, and the language needs to be
refined. And that is a wholly different exercise.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I -- I guess I
was -- was thinking of the mind-set that -- that the
process, the structure, that the PTO uses in the first
place. It looks at a claim. If -- if I were the
examiner to determine whether or not I should grant the
patent, I'd say, I'm going to give this the broadest
interpretation to make sure I'm right. It seems to
me -- or am I wrong, that that's not what they do?
MR. BEENEY: They do, but not to determine
whether the claims are patentable. They do to determine
whether there's ambiguity in the language.
And, Your Honor, you can go back to a whole
line of district court cases from -- all the way from
Carr in, I think, 1924 in -- in the D.C. circuit to the
2016 decision in PCC Broadband, and all the cases in
between, Skvorecz and -- and In re Hyatt and all the
other ones. The purpose of the
broadest-reasonable-interpretation expedient -- and it's
called an "expedient" for a reason -- is to determine
whether claim language has ambiguity in it.
If it does, then the patent owner can amend
and -- and does so as of right in examinational context,
not in the IPR context, the patent owner can amend to
clarify that her claims really don't mean what they may
broadly be construed to mean.
JUSTICE BREYER: But the question that
Justice Kennedy asked, and I think it's an important
one, to me, anyway, was, if you -- forget this
proceeding. If, in fact, in the broadest possible, or
whatever, reasonable interpretation and you were in
front of the Patent Office, and that's what they would
look at, and if it was too broad because that broad, you
know, it has flaws in it of whatever kind, the patent
doesn't issue. Is that right or not right?
MR. BEENEY: It's not a question --
JUSTICE BREYER: It's either right or wrong.
You can tell me I'm right, or you can tell me I'm wrong.
MR. BEENEY: There isn't an iterative
process with the right to amend --
JUSTICE BREYER: I know that.
MR. BEENEY: So --
JUSTICE BREYER: I know that. I'm saying:
If at the end of the day, on the broadest reasonable
interpretation, it is not patentable, there is no patent
issued.
MR. BEENEY: That's correct.
JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. Now --
MR. BEENEY: That is correct.
JUSTICE BREYER: -- if that's so, you could
look at this new law as -- as -- as you were looking at
it, as trying to build a little court proceeding. If I
thought it was just doing that, I would say you were
right.
But there is another way to look at it. And
the other way to look at it -- and that's what I would
like your comment about -- is that there are these
things, for better words, let's call them patent trolls,
and that the -- the Patent Office has been issuing
billions of patents that shouldn't have been issued -- I
overstate -- but only some. And what happens is some
person in business gets this piece of paper and -- and
looks at it and says, oh, my God, I can't go ahead with
my invention.
And so what we're trying to do with this
process is to tell the office, you've been doing too
much too fast. Go back and let people who are hurt by
this come in and get rid of those patents that shouldn't
have been issued. Now, we will give you, again, once
the same chance we gave you before, and that is you can
amend it once if you convince the judge you should have
done it before. But if, on the broadest possible
interpretation, you know, reasonable interpretation, it
shouldn't have been issued, we're canceling it. And --
and that is for the benefit of those people who were
suffering from too many patents that shouldn't have been
issued in the first place. I don't know.
If it's that second purpose, then I would
think, well, maybe this is right, what they're doing.
And if it's ambiguous between those two purposes, I
would begin to think, well, maybe they should have the
power themselves under Chevron, Meade, or whatever, to
decide which to do.
Now, that's -- that's the argument, I think,
that's in my mind registering the other way. So what do
you say?
MR. BEENEY: Justice Breyer, if I agreed --
and respectfully, I'd like to explain why I disagree.
JUSTICE BREYER: Uh-huh.
MR. BEENEY: But -- but even if I did agree,
I -- I would say that Congress, in fact, established
exactly what Your Honor described. But it established a
system in which we are adjudicating property rights.
And it makes no more sense to adjudicate those property
rights in a court-like setting by pretending that those
rights are not what, in fact, was granted, what the
patentee claims, or what the patentee could assert in
district court infringement litigation than it does
to -- when you're in -- trying to determine whether
someone's property encroaches on another, which -- which
I would submit is really an apt analogy for the
obviousness-anticipation tests. We look at what the
boundaries -- the metes and bounds of that property
actually is.
So Congress, assuming that it did what Your
Honor suggested, established a system to do that, but it
established a system to adjudicate in a court-like
setting the actual patent rights that a patentee
obtains, not ones that someone suggests might be
broader. That is to determine ambiguity in claim
language, not to adjudicate rights.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. If language
is ambiguous, it can't have that plain meaning, can it?
MR. BEENEY: I'm sorry?
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How would you have a
plain meaning that a district court would apply if
language is ambiguous? How could it say that you have a
valid property right in something that's ambiguous?
MR. BEENEY: The test of the ordinary
meaning, as enunciated by Philips and its progeny, will
first look at the claim language. If there's ambiguity
in the claim language, then what is the meaning of that
patent will be determined in light of the specification,
the prosecution history, and other intrinsic evidence.
In the rare case where there still may be
ambiguity, then the Court may consider extrinsic
evidence, dictionaries, other writings by the patentee,
what somebody of ordinary skill in the art might
determine a particular claim limitation to mean.
So there are a number of tools in the
ordinary-meaning-construction standard that should be
used here to --
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Aren't those tools used
in determining the broadest -- the broadest reasonable
reading, meaning how can the PTO decide what a broad
reasonable reading is unless it looks at all of those
factors and decides that the specifications and all the
other things don't cure, continue to provide ambiguity
in the patent?
MR. BEENEY: It -- it does not. The
broadest reasonable interpretation is considerably
different than the ordinary meaning of construction
standard, and the fact that the Patent and Trademark
Office has admitted as much. In the manual for patent
examination procedures, the Patent and Trademark Office
tells its patent examiners, we, quote, "do not interpret
claims in the same manners as the courts."
Just recently, a very important tool that
courts look at in the ordinary-meaning context, the
prosecution history, in the Federal Register the Patent
and Trademark Office said that the only time it looks at
prosecution history is when it is actually raised by the
parties, relied on by the parties, and explained by the
parties.
There are very different sub tools, if you
will, within broadest reasonable interpretation and
ordinary meaning, and that's because they intend to
accomplish different purposes. One adjudicates
patentability, which is what Congress intended in IPR.
The other identifies ambiguity in claim language.
In fact --
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why --
MR. BEENEY: -- if one looks at -- if one
looks at the manual in Section 2111, the PTO tells its
examiners that one of the reasons we use the broadest
reasonable interpretation is because, unlike the courts,
we don't have before us a fully-developed prosecution
history. Well, when you're in inter partes review, you
do have a fully-developed prosecution history, and
that's what we should be looking at.
================================
According to Mr Beeney, there is a difference between BRI and ordinary meaning where each is used for different reasons.
Of course, in reading e.Digitals IPR circumstance there is verbiage by the PTAB, to the effect, that they(PTAB) are following standards set by Congress implicitly in the AIA legislation....lol.
The system is a scam and always will be, I guess. There is nothing about it for the people at all.
FWIW
doni