TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Comark Communs. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ............................ 1, 13
Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .................................... 1, 6
Liebel Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................. 1, 13
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ........................... 1, 13
Philips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ...................................................... 13
Polycom, Inc. v. Codian Ltd., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97892, *93-94 (E.D. Tex. 2007) ......... 3, 12
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ............................... 13
CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS
A. “social signature”
The claims, not the specifications, define the right to exclude. Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Comark Communs. v. Harris Corp., 156
F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In its attempt to support its narrow proposed construction of
“social signature,” as with nearly all of its proposed constructions, Dropcam improperly cherrypicks
embodiments described in the specification. However, it is inappropriate to import claim
limitations from the specification absent a clear intention to limit the scope of the claims. See
Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Liebel Flarsheim
Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[e]ven when the specification
describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless
the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using words or
expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction”)
1. The Specifications Make Clear That The Social Signature May
Include Information Other Than Just “Raw Or Processed Data.”
Dropcam wrongly argues that a “social signature” must be limited to “received sensor
data.” (Dropcam Responsive Brief at 5:14-16.) Dropcam’s argument reveals a fundamental
misunderstanding regarding the claims and claim terms contained in each of the Nunchi patents.
For example, in the “device location” embodiment discussed in the specifications, the processor
starts with the sensor data. (Ex. A (’522 patent) at 1:47-58; see also id. at 3:47-60 and passim.)
However, in the process of constructing the detected social signature, the processor compares the
incoming sensor data with “map data.” (Id. at 1:47-58.) Nothing in the specification or claims
limits this “map data” to data obtained directly from a sensor. Thus, “map data” could be stored
or otherwise retrievable information from a map application, software or other stored or
retrievable data. (See id. at 13:40-45 (“the mapping processor can compare the sensed location
with a map stored in the mobile device 100 or retrieved from a query to an internet service such
as MapQuest or Google maps, and determine the location as being a restaurant, store, office or
other like location according to such publicly available information”).)
The detected social signature is then created, which includes “information on the map
location of the communication device.” (Emphasis added.) (Ex. A (’522 patent) at 1:47-58.)
Importantly, the quoted embodiment does not disclose sensor data comprising a “map location.”
(Id.) The embodiment makes clear that the “map location” is only derived after a comparison of
the sensor data with “map data.” (Id.) The resulting “map location,” e.g., “restaurant,” “store,
“office,” etc. is not sensor data in these embodiments, but is “based on” the sensor data. Thus, in
this embodiment, the social signature can be constructed to include not just the raw sensor data,
but “information based on” data retrieved from the sensors and/or other retrievable information.
2. The Social Signature May Exclude Optical And Acoustic Sensor Data.
Citing the ’618 patent, Dropcam mistakenly argues that all claims require that the
detected sensor data includes [sic] ‘a first detected sensor value … from an optical sensor and
second sensor value … from an acoustic sensor.’” (Dropcam Responsive Brief at 6:1-4.) First,
while claim 22 of the ’618 patent, relied upon by Dropcam, does expressly require that the first
and second sensor values of the social signature of that claim be derived from the optical and
acoustic sensors, respectively, other claims and patents descended from the parent ’522 patent,
which share the same specification, are not so limiting. For example, as noted in the Opening
Brief, U.S. Patent No. 9,002,331, which is a direct continuation of the ’522 patent, only mentions
optical and audio sensors in one claim – independent claim 21. None of the other claims of that
patent require optical or audio sensors, let alone a social signature comprised of data derived
from said sensors. (See Exhibit G, claims 1-25.) Further, the “map location” embodiment
described in the previous section above contains no mention of the presence of acoustic or
optical sensor information in the constructed social signature. (Ex. A (’522 patent) at 1:47-58;
13:40-45.)
Finally, Dropcam further concedes that the claims of the Nunchi patents cover systems
using sensors other than optical and acoustic sensors and that a social signature can include data
obtained from these other sensors. (Dropcam Responsive Brief at 7:5-8.)1 If the inventor
1 Dropcam contends that its construction does not limit the social signature to acoustic
and optical sensor data only, but that its proposed construction only requires the social signature
to include “at least” acoustic and optical sensor data. (Id.) The plain language of its proposed
