CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ERRORS MADE BY DISTRICT COURTS IN 2002-03(1)
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Jul 16, 2011 12:13PM
David J.F. Gross
James W. Poradek
Timothy E. Grimsrud
Faegre & Benson LLP
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ERRORS
MADE BY DISTRICT COURTS IN 2002-03
Claim construction is one of the most complex and important components of patent litigation.This is why district courts and lawyers frequently devote significant resources and time to conducting a Markman hearing. Unfortunately, all too frequently these efforts seem wasted when the claim construction is corrected on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.In fact, based on a review of published claim construction cases from September 2002 through June 2003, these authors determined that the Federal Circuit corrected the district court’s claim construction in 29 out of 39 cases.This accounts for an “error rate” of about 74 percent.
This Article focuses exclusively on the 29 published cases in which the Federal Circuit modified the construction of the district court. Of these 29 cases, the Federal Circuit found that the district courts construed the claims too narrowly in 22 of the cases, too broadly in five of the cases, and construed some claims too narrowly and other claims too broadly in two of the cases.Finally, the Federal Circuit reversed or vacated the district courts’ rulings in 25 of the 29 cases involving some type of modification.
A persistent theme of the Federal Circuit’s “broadening” holdings is that the district courts have overlooked the ordinary and accustomed meaning of claim terms.This is not to suggest the district courts are failing to make a concerted effort at the correct interpretation.On the contrary, the district courts, for the most part, pay close attention to decisions of the Federal Circuit and try to apply the claim construction doctrines accurately.
A principal error found by the Federal Circuit in many of the cases was the apparent importation of limitations from the specification to the claims.Our review indicates that the Federal Circuit, in compliance with Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002), and its progeny, is placing an increased emphasis on dictionaries and the need to ascertain the ordinary meaning of claim terms before consulting the intrinsic evidence.However, as illustrated by Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., even when a district court adopts a claim construction framework in line with Texas Digital, the Federal Circuit is still prone to making corrections.Worse still for district courts, while in some cases the Federal Circuit seems to apply the Texas Digital framework, in others it appears to apply a less stringent framework.
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that the plain language of claim 1 of the ‘124 patent recited “a filter bed having a non-buoyant particulate media filter layer,” and in no way required the added limitations of transitional and flocculation layers.Id. at 1263.The Court found that construing “filter bed” to include the transitional and flocculation layers would conflict directly with this plain language.Id. at 1264.In addition, the Federal Circuit explained that the doctrine of claim differentiation dictated that “filter bed” should not be construed to include a transitional layer and a flocculation layer.Otherwise, independent claim 7, which included the “flocculation layer” limitation, and claim 12, which was dependent on claim 7, would be meaningless.Id.The canon of claim differentiation also supported rejecting the district court’s construction because the only difference between claim 7 and claim 12 was the addition of the transitional layer limitation in claim 12.Id.
The Federal Circuit explained that the district court’s analysis missed the distinction between the canon of interpreting claims in light of the specification and the canon of not importing limitations from the specification into the claims.The Court stated that while the specification may provide guidance as to the meaning of a disputed term, “a court may not use the specification to reset the clearly defined boundaries of the different claims.”Id. at 1264.In this case, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court used the specification for more than mere guidance because its construction “ran afoul of the patent boundaries expressly set by the patentee with different claims.”Id.