"A deeper look at current agreements Lessons from De Beers Victor Mine is located roughly 90 kilometres from Attawapiskat First Nation and is located on the traditional territory of the Mushkegowuk Cree. Between 2005 and 2009, IBAs were signed between De Beers and Attawapiskat, Kashechewan, Fort Albany, and Moose Cree First Nations. At the time, entering into these agreements went beyond the regulatory requirements, which were primarily focused on environmental impacts (Siebermorgan 2010). These IBAs include assistance for education and training, hiring preferences for Aboriginal peoples from the communities, bid preferences for First Nations businesses, financial contributions for social and economic development, and labour clauses to permit cultural breaks for Aboriginal employees to pursue traditional practices like hunting (Priority Project on Sustainable Resource Development 2013). De Beers also pays up to $2 million a year in royalties to Attawapiskat, which is split between a trust fund and community development. In 2015, this community trust fund held $13 million while nearly 40 percent of the De Beers labour force was Aboriginal, mostly from Attawapiskat and the surrounding communities (Talaga 2015). A number of issues emerged during the consultation process including a lack of trust, misunderstandings about the project, and issues with communications, especially with regards to the absence of applicable words in the local dialect (Fowler 2008). De Beers started the process early with Attawapiskat. However, the additional IBAs were initiated after other communities established a blockade over concerns with consultation. There was also significant tension between the communities over            

who would and should benefit as well as debate within the communities over the environmental impacts (McCarthy, Whitelaw, and Tsuji 2010; Siebermorgan 2010). It was important, however, for De Beers to be in the community and the company gradually built relationships (Fowler 2008). They held hundreds of meetings in the communities (Stewart 2009) and the VP of Aboriginal Affairs and Sustainability stated at the time, “It was very important to ensure that we told people what was planned, did what we said we would do, and could report back and demonstrate that this had happened” (Fowler 2008, 25). Engagement was also important in order to address concerns as early as possible (Fowler 2008). Implementation has been a real challenge. The communities were, in many crucial respects, not ready to take advantage of the opportunities. Many local individuals lacked the basic education and training requirements to take advantage of the employment and economic opportunities (Priority Project on Sustainable Resource Development 2013; Siebermorgan 2010). A lack of communication and understanding of the terms of the IBA between Chief and council and community members has also been an issue (Siebermorgan 2010). There have also been several blockades on the ice road leading to Victor Mine, including one in 2013 that resulted in a court injunction against the First Nations (CBC News 2013). This blockade was reportedly caused by personal grievances over employment, compensation for lost traplines, environmental concerns, and concerns related to housing (Barrera 2013). The Victor Mine demonstrates the fundamental challenges with meeting all of the industry, government, and Indigenous expectations surrounding mining. One former Chief stated, “De Beers Canada’s diamond mine is the first and only opportunity our community has ever had to break free of our soul-destroying poverty” (Sudol 2008). This statement is accurate; there are few other market-oriented economic opportunities in the region and none with the scale, value, and employment possibilities of a large-scale mine operated by a sophisticated global mining company. And the mining companies, regardless of how much they want to be constructive and engaged partners, are not responsible for the decades-long challenges associated with poverty, marginalization, and the personal and collective crises in the North. But mining companies are often the only ones directly in the North that are accessible to First Nations and with the financial resources needed to deal with real and desperate local concerns. There is a basic reality here that argues in favour of placing a higher priority on government involvement. Exploration and mineral development are extremely risky and proceed on the basis of anticipated productivity and global prices and demand for minerals. Unlike mining companies, which operate each project independently, governments have the capacity to pool risk and to transfer returns from multiple projects. For example, the Victor mine brought employment and business opportunities. But the Victor mine did not, and could not, address the challenges associated with social well-being, housing, and water, to say nothing of other community political and societal needs. As this instance demonstrates, mining can be part of the solution for Indigenous economic opportunities in the Far North, but it can in no way overcome past injustices, contemporary social needs, and the long-term structural problems in isolated Indigenous communities. Community readiness: Wabun Tribal Council The approach used by Wabun Tribal Council (WTC) is seen by many in industry, government, and other First Nations as one of the best examples in Ontario for community engagement and readiness in the mining sector. WTC represents Brunswick House, Chapleau Ojibwe, Flying Post, Matachewan, The Victor Mine demonstrates the fundamental challenges with meeting all of the industry, government, and Indigenous expectations surrounding mining. 18 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES, GLIMMERS OF HOPE Aboriginal communities and mineral development in Northern Ontario Mattagami, and Beaverhouse, all near Timmins (and therefore operating in the “Near North” as opposed to the “Far North”). With WTC, resource development agreements are not optional. The Tribal Council has negotiated roughly 50 MOUs and exploration agreements and at least 5 IBAs over the last 10 years. They started with mapping their traditional territories, which includes economic boundaries and buffer zones that recognize overlapping territories between communities. WTC also reached a consensus with communities that if a project is located in a buffer zone, those communities will negotiate together on a single resource development agreement. WTC has also worked out a funding formula and revenue allocation with its communities. They have a process that is outlined to project proponents in the early stages of exploration, including initial exploration agreements that are often negotiated in less than a day (Intergovernmental Working Group on the Mineral Industry 2014). Elements of their exploration agreement includes “the allocation of economic benefits, requirements for consultation and engagement, considerations regarding cultural activities, a successor clause that requires the EA to be transferred to the new company if claims are sold, and a commitment to engage in and fund IBA negotiations if the exploration project develops into a mine project” (Intergovernmental Working Group on the Mineral Industry 2014, 28). The IBAs also include opportunities for First Nation businesses like bid preferences and engagement in the evaluation of tenders (Phelan 2015). More importantly, to avoid politics, they ensure that negotiations only occur between the company and members of the negotiating team. To counteract the implementation gap, each IBA has an IBA committee and IBA Coordinator who spends most of their time at the mine site promoting the terms of the IBA (Intergovernmental Working Group on the Mineral Industry 2014)...."

from the document: 

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES, GLIMMERS OF HOPE Aboriginal communities and mineral development in Northern Ontario

HEATHER HALL AND KEN S. COATES MAY 2017

Very informative regarding the complexities of Mining development in Ontario  in general and as it relates to the ROF in particular ,and possible ways forward (i.e existing Best Practise Guidelines chiefly in other (Provincial) jurisdictions....but it's a long document (~25 pages)

Cheers,

Luker