Proxy Info.
posted on
Oct 15, 2008 07:38AM
NI 43-101 Update (September 2012): 11.1 Mt @ 1.68% Ni, 0.87% Cu, 0.89 gpt Pt and 3.09 gpt Pd and 0.18 gpt Au (Proven & Probable Reserves) / 8.9 Mt @ 1.10% Ni, 1.14% Cu, 1.16 gpt Pt and 3.49 gpt Pd and 0.30 gpt Au (Inferred Resource)
4. DISTINCTION BETWEEN SOLICITED AND UNSOLICITED PROXIES The right of a shareholder to appoint a proxy (the proxyholder) to attend and vote at meetings on his or her behalf is a statutory right. It does not exist at common law and yet, subject to the statutory requirements, it is governed by the common law of agency. Moreover, the categories of solicited and unsolicited proxies directly affect the application of agency principles to the proxy process. The principal policy objective of the proxy system is to ensure that, as much as practicable, shareholders are provided with sufficiently detailed, accurate information, in the form of the management information circular, upon which to make a reasoned decision and to be given a form of proxy which preserves the shareholder’s freedom to support or reject the propositions advanced by management in the circular. Solicited proxies are those obtained on request (the “solicitation”) by management or by a dissident group. The completed proxy will usually be in the form provided by the soliciting party. The shareholder does not give an “unsolicited proxy” in response to any solicitation. It simply represents the shareholder’s exercise of his or her right to appoint someone to attend and vote on his or her behalf at the meeting. The corporation cannot purport to prescribe the form to be used by a shareholder wishing to appoint a proxy, although it may require proxies to be deposited by a prescribed time, not less than 48 hours prior to the meeting.
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Among the many important reforms to the Canadian proxy system recommended by the Kimber Report
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was the recommendation that solicited proxies provide shareholders with a choice to vote “for” or “against”
each specific proposition, the so-called “two-way proxy”. That recommendation is today reflected in
Canadian corporate proxy rules such that any person soliciting proxies, be it on behalf of management or
a dissident group, is required to provide shareholders with the alternative to support or reject the
proposition(s) for which the proxies are being solicited.
A glaring example of a management solicitation in which that choice was effectively denied is found in
Goldhar v. D’Aragon Mines Ltd
.22
The management-solicited proxy in that case allowed shareholders to
vote for or against a resolution calling for the removal of the incumbent board of directors. The proxy also contained the proviso that any proxies cast in favour of the proposal to remove the incumbent directors would be denied the opportunity to be counted on the subsequent vote for new directors, in which the incumbent directors would be standing for re-election! The Court held the proxy form to be void for failure to provide shareholders with the right to exercise their choice in connection with “the transaction of business stated in the requisition”.
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20
BCCA, supra note 3, s. 151(9); CBCA, supra
note 4, s. 148(5).
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Ontario, The Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario
(Ontario: Queen's Printer, 1965)
[Kimber Report].
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(1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 80, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 16 (H.C.J.) [Goldhar
cited to D.L.R.].
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. at 18-19.