In reflecting on the results of his first-ever visit to Venezuela, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin estimated on Monday that Venezuelan orders for Russian weapons "could exceed $5 billion." The resulting headlines are somewhat misleading, and may overlook developments that will have a larger impact on the bilateral relationship in coming years.

The $5 billion figure appears to include Russian arms still being supplied under existing contracts, including four MI-17 multirole combat helicopters whose delivery coincided with Putin's visit. These were the last in a contract for 38 of the helicopters signed in 2006. No new arms deals were announced before, during, or after Putin's trip last week.

After signing a dozen contracts with Russia to buy a total of $4.4 billion worth of weapons between 2005 and 2007, Venezuela made no major purchases in 2008 and early 2009, despite the Russian government approving a $1 billion loan in September 2008 to facilitate such sales. One possible explanation for the lull is that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez anticipated a possible thaw in relations with the United States after his North American nemesis, former President George W. Bush, had left office. However, it is also possible that the decline in world energy prices simply forced Venezuela to rein in its military spending.

After visiting Moscow in September 2009, Chavez announced that Venezuela would purchase additional weapons, including advanced T-72 tanks and a variety of air-defense systems, but only after the Russian government agreed to loan Venezuela $2.2 billion to cover the costs. The terms of the loan are still under discussion, as are additional Venezuelan purchases of Russian weapons.

Chavez says he turned to Russia for arms primarily because the United States refused to sell his government any more weapons, while also preventing such sales by U.S. allies. Washington introduced an arms export ban on Venezuela in 2006 that applies to all U.S. companies as well as foreign weapons that contain American-made components -- a provision that has blocked proposed weapons sales from Europe and Israel. The U.S. imposed the embargo on the grounds that the Chavez administration was assisting a foreign terrorist group -- the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas in neighboring Colombia. Before the embargo, Venezuela imported almost 80 percent of its defense equipment from the United States and Western Europe. Sales from Russia now represent an even greater percentage of Venezuela's purchases.

It is unclear what Chavez plans to do with all these imported weapons, which far exceed what Venezuela needs for defending its territory against neighboring countries. The most plausible interpretation is that he genuinely fears a possible U.S. attack, reflecting a serious misjudgment of the Obama administration's intentions for the region.

For its part, the Obama administration is concerned about the continuing stream of arms to Venezuela, which U.S. officials argue are both disproportionate to Venezuela's defense needs and a potential source of weapons to the guerrillas in neighboring Colombia. As Assistant Secretary of State Philip Crowley explained at yesterday's State Department briefing, "Our primary concern . . . is that if Venezuela is going to increase its military hardware, we certainly don't want to see this hardware migrate into other parts of the hemisphere. And we would simply remind Venezuela that, through a number of accords, [it] has responsibility for transparency in its acquisitions and [their] purpose."

In this regard, Washington worries that Chavez will either authorize, or unofficially tolerate, arms transfers to third parties, especially the FARC and other guerrilla allies. Normally the Russian government demands that purchasers of its arms agree not to transfer them to a third party without Moscow's permission, so it would be interesting to see how Russia might react to such a transfer.

When asked in Caracas how Washington would view his recent arms deals, Putin responded, "If the U.S. doesn't want to supply weapons to other countries, including Venezuela, then . . . it's good for us, and long may it continue. As we say in Russia, there is always someone to fill a vacancy."

That said, most of the 31 agreements that Putin signed while in Venezuela apparently deal with economic and energy issues. Indeed, the non-military contracts may be more significant than the arms deals, as Venezuela is eager to secure not just weapons, but also Russian foreign investment. Most Western companies have shunned Venezuela in search of more stable investment climates, due to the Chavez government's aggressive push for state control over the country's major extractive industries, such as oil, gas, and various mineral resources.

With respect to the latter, the Russian-Canadian mining company Ruso announced in 2009 that it would develop the gold reserves at the Las Cristinas and Brisas mines, worth an estimated $30 billion. Chavez has said he wants Venezuela's mineral resources to become the country's second-largest source of export earnings after oil. To that end, he reaffirmed that Russia and Venezuela would establish a bilateral bank to finance joint development projects in Venezuela in the sector, as well as in such areas as infrastructure and railways. This proposed bi-national financial institution has been planned for several years now, but despite Gazprombank's commitment last year to provide an initial loan of $4 billion, it remains on the drawing board.

Energy is also an important dimension in Russian-Venezuelan relations, one with much future growth potential. Although Venezuela has almost 8 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, many of them are hard to access and in the form of extra-heavy crude requiring additional refining. A natural partnership therefore exists, in which Russian companies provide financing and technology in return for the opportunity to help develop Venezuela's oil and gas deposits.

This February, Venezuela's state oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, and a consortium of five Russian energy companies -- including Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazprom, TNK-BP, and Surgutneftegaz -- established a joint venture to develop the Junin 6 oil block located along Venezuela's Orinoco River. Two days before Putin's arrival, the Venezuelan government said the project would start producing 50,000 barrels daily by the end of this year. Analysts estimate the Junin 6 block has an estimated 53 billion barrels of extra-heavy crude, and that it could produce 400,000 to 450,000 barrels each day when fully developed. During his visit, Putin delivered the first $600 million of the initial $1 billion total that the Russian National Oil Consortium must provide for its 40 percent share of the project. The total cost of developing the Junin 6 block over the next two to three decades could exceed $20 billion.

The Russian government also recommitted to assisting Venezuela in developing civilian nuclear power to help the country overcome its recurring electricity shortages. However, these plans remain very much at a preliminary stage, primarily because they would cost billions of dollars that the Venezuelan government currently does not possess and that Russia does not appear willing to lend.

Russia faces two key problems in its relations with Venezuela. First, both countries are suffering financially due to the protracted slump in world energy prices, with bilateral trade falling to $958 million last year, after rising above $1 billion in 2007. But because trade remains largely one-way -- Russia imported only $400,000 of goods from Venezuela in 2008 -- the decrease is felt more strongly in Russia.

Second, although Venezuela is an important Latin American country, its economic and political weight is much less than that of Brazil, Mexico, and other states in the continent. Russia's current regional position therefore resembles that of the Soviet Union, with a few economically weak Latin American allies -- now including Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua -- that rely heavily on Moscow's subsidies and other assistance. Perhaps for this reason, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will be flying to Argentina and then Brazil for a meeting of the BRIC bloc -- Brazil, Russia, India and China -- after attending the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington.

Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor. His weekly WPR column, Global Insights, appears every Tuesday.

Photo: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on board the Russian frigate "Admiral Chabanenko," La Guaira, Venezuela, November 2008 (Kremlin photo, licensed under the Creative Commons 3.0 Unported Attribution).